On automated elections

In any computerization effort, the range of possible solutions is almost limitless, from the simplest and cheapest solution to the very sophisticated and almost impractically expensive. The implementation time is directly proportional to the simplicity of the solution; the simpler it is, the sooner it is implemented, and the more complicated it is, the longer it takes.

The simplest automated election systems started with the use of the telephone, over which election results tabulated in the election precincts were communicated to a central office which consolidated all the tabulations. If I remember correctly, this was used by political parties even before the Marcos years to keep tabs on how they were doing.

Then during the snap elections called by Pres Marcos, computers were used to tabulate election returns from around the country. That was when 30 data entry clerks walked out because of what they claimed was government tampering with the election results. That was the first time computers were used in an attempt to speed up election results. It was also the first time that electronic cheating was resorted to in elections.

The system used then, is basically the same system being proposed by TransparentElection for the 2010 elections, updated for technological advancements. In 1986, ballots were counted and tabulated in the election precincts. Then, the results were phoned in to the central tabulating office in the PICC, where they were entered into the computer system. And that was where the data entry clerks claimed the results were being manipulated.

The Open Election System (OES) of TransparentElection will also rely on tabulated results from the election precincts. This time because of improved data communications capability, the OES will relay the results from the precincts to a secure website via a PC located in the voting precinct, and data communication lines. Once the precincts votes have been tabulated, the results can be transmitted over the data lines in seconds.

TransparentElection's safeguard against tampering is the fact that the results will be posted immediately in a secure website for all to see as soon as the results are emailed to the site. Once there, any tampering will be very apparent.

Yesterday, the COMELEC issued an invitation to anyone to try and crack the source codes of the programs to be used in the Optical Mark Reader (OMR) system it proposes. COMELEC says they will make available the source codes. They also invite anyone to hack into the computer system to be used during the elections.

TransparentElections has basically offered the same thing. Their source codes are available to anyone who wishes to inspect them. I'm sure they will also invite the general public to try and hack into the communications systems and secure website of their OES.

But there is a truism any thief knows – there is no lock that can't be opened, even without the key. No matter what safeguards are placed, given unlimited time and resources, the lock can always be cracked open. So, the idea of challenges is an empty boast. Any system can always be hacked.

The idea of inspecting source codes sounds good. But once the program is inside the computer, who knows whether the source codes that were inspected are the ones that are running in production mode?

If you want a failure of elections, you don't have to hack the computer system. Just bring the system down for a few minutes, enough to plant seeds of doubt in the minds of everyone who is concerned with the outcome. It doesn't have to be the administration who would do this. The opposition could do it too, just to disrupt the elections.

What reason would the opposition have in doing that, assuming the voting goes their way? Several reasons actually - to destroy the credibility of the elections itself and of future elections, to claim that the administration did it, to create chaos and foment civil disturbance. Just because people oppose an evil administration doesn't make them angels.

But after the temporary break down of the system, the original ballots are still available and can be recounted. Both proposed systems have this feature. The only problem will be the delay in the proclamation of winners, but as everyone knows, delays allow unwanted miracles to happen.

Another thing. Both the OES and the OMR systems assume that the voters' list is clean and valid, and that the voters can be accurately verified in this list before they are allowed to vote. Big assumption! In the computer world, another truism is: 'Garbage in, garbage out.”

So what is the conclusion then? That automated elections are an impossibility and should not be pursued? No, I'm just saying much more thought, and work, has to be brought to bear on the problem. 

Is there enough time before May 2010? Yes, if everyone - the COMELEC, TransparentElections, the political parties, and other concerned parties – can come together, for an honest and open discussion about the matter. A solution can be found in time for the next elections. It won't be state-of-the-art, and may not be 'pretty', but it will work to the satisfaction of the majority, and preserve the integrity of the elections.

Some of the parties will participate in the discussion in good faith, with the noblest intentions. Others will not be as noble. If there is overpricing in government purchases of goods and services, it's because someone needs to receive a portion of the overpricing. If someone is waiting for his/her portion, it's because he/she is powerful enough to influence the outcome of the purchasing process. If he/she doesn't get what is expected, the process is sabotaged.

Thus, one of the things that must be threshed out is how to prevent the process from getting sabotaged. One solution is of course, to pay the piper. Another is to make sure the process is sabotage-proof.

So many problems. Are there enough courageous men of integrity in the Philippines to solve them?